

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00416 01 OF 03 191612Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----116530 191626Z /44

P 191523Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2294

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0416

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES
OF JULY 18, 1977

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: ON JULY 18, 1977, US REP AND DEPREP MET WITH
SOVIET REPS TARASOV AND SHUSTOV AT SOVIET INVITATION TO
REVIEW SITUATION AT END OF ROUND. SOVIET REPS GAVE NEGATIVE
PRELIMINARY REACTION TO THE WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL, WITH THEIR
OBJECTIONS EMPHASIZING INTRUSIVE NATURE OF PROPOSAL, AND
EXPRESSED GENERAL PESSIMISM ABOUT FUTURE OF NEGOTIATIONS, BASED
ON CLAIMS THAT THE WESTERN POSITION ON MBFR WAS HARDENING AS
A REFLECTION OF HARDENING OF GENERAL WESTERN POSITION AGAINST
DETENTE, PARTICULARLY THE US POSITION. END SUMMARY

2. AT OUTSET, TARASOV ASKED US REP TO SUMMARIZE EVENTS OF ROUND.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00416 01 OF 03 191612Z

US REP SAID HE THOUGHT THE MAIN POSITIVE ASPECT OF THE PAST
ROUND WAS THE CONTINUATION OF DATA DISCUSSION IN A BUSINESSLIKE
WAY, WITH THE RECOGNITION BY BOTH SIDES THAT THE IMMEDIATE
PURPOSE WAS TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN
WESTERN AND EASTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT MILITARY MANPOWER.
THIS DISCUSSION WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IN PRACTICE THERE WAS NO
WAY IN WHICH AN AGREEMENT COULD BE ACHIEVED UNLESS THERE WAS

AGREEMENT ON DATA. GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A LARGE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN DATA ON WARSAW PACT FORCES AND THAT THIS FACT WAS WIDELY KNOWN IN THE WEST, NO AGREEMENT BASED ON PAPERING OVER THE UNRESOLVED EXISTENCE OF A DISCREPANCY COULD HOPE FOR ACCEPTANCE BY GOVERNMENTS OR PARLIAMENTS. WESTERN EXPERTS ON EASTERN FORCES, AFTER REVIEWING THEIR FIGURES, CONTINUED TO CONSIDER THAT THE EAST HAD A SUBSTANTIAL NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER. THESE EXPERTS WOULD OF COURSE NOT REMAIN SILENT IF ANYONE IN THE WEST SHOWED ANY INCLINATION TO IGNORE THIS FACT.

3. TARASOV SIAD THAT THESE WESTERN EXPERTS HAD ALREADY INCREASED THE EASTERN SUPERIORITY FROM THE FIGURE OF APPROXIMATELY 150,000 WHICH WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAD REFERRED TO FOR SOME TIME TO THE 176,000 THE SOVIETS HAD READ ABOUT IN THE WESTERN PRESS. WHAT WAS TO STOP THEM FROM INCREASING IT STILL MORE? US REP SAID ANY INCREASES IN WESTERN FIGURES ON WARSAW PACT FORCES WERE BASED ON HARD DATA.

4. TARASOV THEN TURNED TO NEW WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL. HE SAID THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSION OF HIS DELEGATION WAS THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD PRESENT PROBLEMS AND WOULD NOT CONTRIBUTE MATERIALLY TO IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD NO EQUIVALENT OF SOVIET ARMIES. EACH OF THEIR MILITARY DISTRICTS CONTAINED ALL KINDS OF EASTERN FORCES. IF THESE COUNTRIES HAD TO INCLUDE FIGURES FOR ALL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00416 01 OF 03 191612Z

OF THESE PERSONNEL IN THEIR MAJOR UNIT FIGURES, THEY WOULD NOT BE GIVING THE SAME KIND OF DATA AS THE SOVIETS OR AS THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. US REP SAID THE ADVANTAGE OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OVER NATIONAL FIGURES WAS THAT IT WOULD LOCATE THE SOURCE OF THE DISPARITY NOT ONLY AMONG THE INDIVIDUAL EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, BUT WITHIN THE FORCE OF EACH PARTICIPANT. IT WAS NOT EXPECTED THAT THESE WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS WOULD PRESENT DATA ON ALL MILITARY MANPOWER WITHIN EACH DISTRICT UNDER THE HEADING OF MAJOR UNITS BUT WOULD DIVIDE THEIR FORCES LIKE ALL OTHER PARTICIPANTS BETWEEN THE PERSONNEL IN THE MAJOR UNITS AND ALL OTHER PERSONNEL. THIS WAS AN ISSUE WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD BE FOR THESE PARTICIPANTS TO TAKE SOVIET ARMIES AS A MODEL AND TO PUT ALL OTHER FORCES THAT WERE NOT COMPARABLE IN THEIR RESIDUAL FIGURE. TARASOV ASKED WHERE THE GERMAN TERRITORIAL FORCES WOULD BE IN THE WESTERN FIGURES. US REP SAID THEY WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE OTHER FORCES FIGURE. TARASOV ASKED HOW AIR FORCE DATA WOULD BE TABLED. US REP SAID FOR THE EAST, IT COULD BE FOR PERSONNEL OF FORMATIONS COMPARABLE TO SOVIET AIR ARMIES AND COMPARABLE UNITS IN THE WEST. TARASOV SAID THE WEST HAD TWO AIR FORCES, THE FOURTH AND SECOND ATAF, BUT THESE WERE MULTINATIONAL. US REP SAID WEST WOULD TABLE FORMATIONS OF A SINGLE NATIONALITY.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00416 02 OF 03 191639Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----116900 191642Z /41

P 191523Z JUL 77
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2295
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0416

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

5. TARASOV SAID THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE THE EAST TO PUT DOWN A VERY LARGE AMOUNT OF DATA INCLUDING DATA ON ALL OF ITS DIVISIONS. THE US REP SAID DIVISIONAL STRENGTHS WERE OPTIONAL AND NOT A REQUIREMENT. SHUSTOV SAID NEVERTHELESS THIS SHOWED THE WAY IN WHICH THE WEST WOULD PROCEED IF ITS PROPOSAL WERE ACCEPTED. TARASOV SAID THE WEST WANTED TO CONTINUE THE BREAK-DOWN OF DATA ALL THE WAY TO REGIMENT AND BATTALION. THERE WAS NO STOPPING POINT. US REP SAID THERE WAS NO DECISION IN THE WEST TO ENGAGE ON A BREAKDOWN BEYOND THE LEVELS PROPOSED AND THERE WAS NO AUTOMATICITY WITH REGARD TO DIVISIONS. BUT IT WAS NECESSARY THAT A DATA PROPOSAL ENABLE THE EXCHANGE OF MORE DETAILED FIGURES SO THAT WESTERN FIGURES FOR MAJOR EASTERN UNITS COULD BE COMPARED WITH EASTERN DATA. THE WEST HAD DELIBERATELY SELECTED THE LARGEST MAJOR EASTERN UNITS.

6. TARASOV REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE WEST WAS ASKING THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00416 02 OF 03 191639Z

EAST TO TABLE A VERY LARGE NUMBER OF DATA ITEMS, AT LEAST 20, AND THAT THESE ITEMS WOULD GO INTO STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION RATHER THAN IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. HE MADE NO MENTION OF THE SEPARATE DATA FOR PERSONNEL OF MULTINATIONAL HEADQUARTERS. AT THE END OF THE DISCUSSION HE SAID THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES IN MOSCOW AND THAT IT WAS ALREADY CLEAR TO HIM THAT THE NEXT ROUND WOULD BE SPENT, NOT IN DISCUSSING DATA BUT IN DISCUSSING HOW TO TABLE DATA.

7. TARASOV ASKED ABOUT REPORTS OF DISCUSSIONS ON NEW MBFR INITIATIVES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT. US REP SAID HE COULD SAY NOTHING ON DETAILS BUT HE HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR WEST TO MAKE SOME SUGGESTIONS IN THE FALL; AND THAT IF AND WHEN WEST DID MAKE SUGGESTIONS, IT WOULD OF COURSE EXPECT EASTERN MOVES IN RETURN. US REP POINTED OUT THAT IN THE PAST, US DELEGATION HAD EMPHASIZED AT CERTAIN EASTERN MOVES, IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BRING PROGRESS. THESE WERE THAT THE EAST SHOULD RESTRICT US AND SOVIET ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO THE ARMAMENTS WHICH THE WEST HAS PROPOSED; THAT THE EAST SHOULD RESTRICT THE COMMITMENTS WHICH IT DEMANDS FROM THE NON-US WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO THE REDUCTION OF MANPOWER; AND THAT THE EAST SHOULD AGREE TO COMMON COLLECTIVE MANPOWER CEILINGS AT APPROXIMATELY THE FIGURES PROPOSED BY WEST, TOGETHER WITH SPECIFIC LIMITS ON THE US AND SOVIET MANPOWER MAINTAINED IN THE AREA. US REP CONTINUED THAT EAST COULD NOT REALISTICALLY EXPECT A WESTERN MOVE ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES UNLESS DATA DISCUSSION WAS PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS OF EXCHANGE OF MORE DETAILED DATA AS THE WEST HAD PROPOSED.

8. TARASOV SAID THE SOVIETS WOULD NEVER ACCEPT A PROPOSAL WHICH INVOLVED BOTH COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND SUBCEILINGS FOR THE SOVIETS. NO AGREEMENT ON THIS BASIS WAS POSSIBLE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00416 02 OF 03 191639Z

9. US REPS SAID IF TOTAL OF WESTERN FORCES WERE LIMITED AND SOVIETS WERE FREE TO INCREASE THE PROPORTION OF ITS FORCES WITHIN THE TOTAL WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, THE COMBAT VALUE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES WOULD BE INCREASED AND THE WEST WOULD HAVE NO RECOURSE. TARASOV SAID HE HAD HEARD THESE ARGUMENTS BEFORE. THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN POSITION. TARASOV THEN SAID HIS WARSAW TREATY COLLEAGUES AND HE WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT THE WESTERN POSITION IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN HARDENING. THE NATO MEETINGS IN LONDON HAD POSED AN ULTIMATUM TO THE EAST EITHER TO ACCEPT THE WESTERN POSITION AT VIENNA IN ITS PRESENT FORM OR TO ACCEPT

INCREASES IN WESTERN ARMAMENTS. THE WEST WAS DISCUSSING INTRODUCING NEUTRON BOMBS INTO CENTRAL EUROPE AND CRUISE MISSILES AS WELL. THE WESTERN POSITION ON DETENTE WAS HARDENING, PARTICULARLY THE US POSITION. THE WEST IN VIENNA HAD SHOWN NO INTEREST IN MAKING NECESSARY COMPROMISES IN VIENNA. ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS MIGHT BE FAVORABLY INCLINED TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT, BUT THE FORCES ALLIED WITH SENATOR JACKSON WERE STRONGER AND OPPOSED AGREEMENTS WITH THE EAST.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00416 03 OF 03 191644Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
-----116980 191648Z /41

P 191523Z JUL 77

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2296

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0416

EXDIS

NOFORN

DEPT PASS DEFENSE

FROM US REP MBFR

10. US REP SAID WESTERN POSITION WAS NOT HARDENING. THE FACT WAS THAT THE EAST HAD NOT YET MADE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 1975. NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO INTRODUCE NEUTRON BOMB INTO EUROPE AND THE WESTERN PROPOSAL TO LIMIT ALL WARHEADS IN CENTRAL EUROPE STILL STOOD. IT WAS INCORRECT TO CHARACTERIZE ANY RESPONSIBLE GROUP IN THE US AS OPPOSED TO A REASONABLE AGREEMENT IN THE VIENNA TALKS.

11. TARASOV SAID THE MAIN PROBLEM FOR SOVIET FORCES IN EUROPE WAS NOT THE US, BUT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. TRUE, IF THERE WERE A GENERAL WAR, THEN BOTH THE US AND THE SOVIET

UNION WOULD BE INVOLVED. BUT, AS SOVIET MILITARY PLANNERS SAW IT, THERE WAS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BY THE WEST IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN WHICH THE MAIN FORCE WOULD BE THE GERMANS. WHO WOULD HELP THE SOVIET FORCES THEN? FOR THESE REASONS, IN A FORCE REDUCTION AGREEMENT CONCERNING CENTRAL EUROPE, THERE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00416 03 OF 03 191644Z

HAD TO BE MUTUALITY OF TREATMENT OF SOVIET AND FRG FORCES RATHER THAN OF US AND SOVIET FORCES. US REPS POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS HAD EIGHT TIMES MORE MILITARY PERSONNEL OVERALL THAN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC, A VERY STRONG FORCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND STRONG BACKUP FORCES IN THE MILITARY DISTRICTS. THEY POINTED OUT THE NATURAL SENSITIVITY OF THE FRG TO EFFORTS BY THE MUCH LARGER SOVIET UNION TO EXERCISE CONTROL OVER FRG AND WESTERN EUROPEAN MILITARY DECISIONS AND POINTED OUT THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO TREAT THE SOVIET AND FRG FORCES IN THE SAME WAY WERE OF COURSE REINFORCING THESE APPREHENSIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE FRG HAD ALL ITS FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WHERE FORCE WOULD BE LIMITED BY AN AGREEMENT, AND THE SOVIETS DID NOT, THIS POSITION WAS ALSO ILLOGICAL.

12. COMMENT: CZECHOSLOVAKIAN REP REPEATED TARASOV CRITICISMS OF WESTERN DATA PROPOSAL IN INFORMAL SESSION OF 19 JULY. RESOR

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED DEFENSE.

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, MEETINGS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 19-Jul-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977MBFRV00416
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770268-0675
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770743/aaaabkza.tel
Line Count: 307
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 9f689a67-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 29-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1819706
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: BILATERAL CONVERSATION WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES OF JULY 18, 1977
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/9f689a67-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009